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I.

INTRODUCTION

Shawn Klatt is a typical thirty-three year-old male. He is employed by
a small, yet profitable, construction company in the town in which he has
lived all of his life. He spends the vast majority of his day hard at work
building houses, office buildings, and the like for the members of his
community. Like any other person, he sincerely appreciates the time he has
available to do other things, in fact, to do anything not job-related. Because
he is such a dedicated worker, very rarely does he ever get that chance.
It is Saturday night. The day before, Shawn spent most of his day
framing in a new apartment complex that is supposed to be finished in six
months. After an uneventful night of resting, Shawn decides it is time to go
out to his favorite hangout. He gets in his car and drives the thirty-two
miles across the state line to get to his favorite casino. He leaves his car
and walks into his own little dream world.
Shawn has always been drawn to the brilliant lights, the sound of coins
falling out of slot machines, the sea of people floating about, and, most
importantly, he has always been drawn to the chance to strike it rich at the
casino. He dreams of one day hitting the jackpot on his favorite slot
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machine and cruising off to Aruba on his brand new 400-foot yacht. He
thinks, like he usually does, that tonight will be the night.
Shawn brings into the casino with him all the cash he could find in his
modest two-bedroom apartment - a total of $215. Within two hours, the
$215 is the property of the casino. He goes to write a check for more cash,
but the casino will not take it - the check is declined for insufficient funds.
He then proceeds to the ATM machine to get a cash withdrawal from his
credit card. He takes out as much as the credit company will allow him
before reaching his limit, an astonishing $10,000. By the end of the night,
no doubt in part to the "crooked" blackjack dealers, that money is gone as
well. Shawn leaves the casino with absolutely nothing. No money for gas
to get home, no money for clothes for the upcoming winter, no money to
buy food to feed himself. He has lost everything - including his dignity.
This would seem like a very commonplace scenario, and in truth it is.'
What makes it even more interesting, however, is the fact that Shawn is a
compulsive gambler who was on the casino's self-exclusion list. 2 By
voluntarily placing himself on this list, he let the casino know that he
wanted to be stopped from entering the casino to gamble.3 The casino, with
its hundreds of cameras, knew he was there yet did nothing to prevent him
from gambling. Because he believed he would be prevented from entering
the casino, Shawn did not try to spend the little money he did have to seek
help elsewhere for his gambling addiction.4 It is a sad yet all too common
occurrence in this country.
This comment will examine the concept of the self-exclusion doctrine
and the liabilities that should be placed on casinos that have chosen to
implement this type of "helpful" measure, yet fail to follow through. It will
set forth the premise that casinos that choose to implement the selfexclusion procedure, usually through the state's Administrative
Regulations, should have a duty to protect the patrons who choose to put
themselves on the list. In short, this comment will argue that casinos
should have a duty to gamblers who have placed themselves on selfexclusion lists and to patrons whom the casinos know are compulsive
gamblers and wish to be kept out of the casinos. The duty of the casino
would include keeping the gambler off of the premises. The casino should
1. See National Council on Problem Gambling, Frequently Asked Questions About
Gambling and Problem Gambling,
http://www.ncpgambling.org/aboutproblem/aboutproblemfaq.asp (last visited Sept. 20,
2006) (acknowledging that there are over 2 million compulsive gamblers in the United
States).
2.
For an example of the criteria required for person to be "self-excluded," see ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, §§ 3000.750-.790 (2005).
3. See, e.g., ILL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.750 (2005).
4.
See discussion infra notes 205-218.
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be held liable for the gambler's losses when the casino knows, or
reasonably should have known, the patron was on the premises and
negligently failed to exclude that person.
This comment details one of the more recent cases discussing this
dilemma, Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc.,5 and its implications on casinos in
Indiana and across the nation. It will then go through the reasoning
employed by the Merrill court and discuss why this reasoning was in error.
This comment then discusses the status of compulsive gambling in the
nation and the effect that compulsive gambling has not only on the
individual debtors, but on the casinos as well. Two arguments are put forth
as to why casinos should have a duty to monitor and protect these
compulsive gamblers: 1) casinos have the ability and, arguably, are in the
best position to exclude compulsive gamblers; 2) the casinos create a
"special relationship" with gamblers who place themselves on a voluntary
self-exclusion list and this should create a duty and subsequent liability on
the casino for negligently failing to uphold that duty.
A.

MERRILL v. TRUMP INDIANA, INC.

The duty of casinos vis-A-vis compulsive gamblers has not been
litigated extensively. 6 There are only a few cases that have even brought up
this concept in any manner.7 One of these, and the one that most distinctly
sets forth the concept of the self-exclusion list ("list"), is Merrill v. Trump
Indiana, Inc. 8 As with most of these types of cases, this was a case brought
in the federal court system on the basis of diversity. 9 Mark Merrill was a
self-proclaimed compulsive gambler.' 0 Prior to Merrill's run-in with the
casino, which the case itself is about, Merrill had a history of gambling
problems for which he attempted to get help." In 1996, for instance, he2
checked himself into a clinic for compulsive gamblers in Peoria, Illinois.1
Upon checking in, the clinic became his "guardian/custodian/trustee in all
matters pertaining to the recognition and treatment of the symptoms and
The
underlying causes of [his] addictive and compulsive behaviors....
5.
320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003).
While a number of casinos have settled out of court, there have been few cases
6.
that have actually received judicial treatment.
7.
See, e.g., Merrill, 320 F.3d 729.
8.
320 F.3d 729.
9.
Id. at 730. Most of these cases are diversity cases because only a limited
number of states have casinos; therefore, gamblers are often required to travel to a different
state to patronize a casino.
10.
Id.
11.
See id.
12.
Id. at 731.
13.
Id.
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clinic, acting in a fiduciary manner for Merrill, allegedly contacted
Merrill's most frequented casino and attempted to enter into an oral
contract whereby the casino would remove Merrill from the casino
premises should he attempt to enter.14 In return for the casino's help in this
matter, the clinic allegedly promised to "publicize to the community"' 5 the
casino's willingness to help compulsive gamblers break the habits that seem
to control their lives.' 6 In addition to the disclosure made to the casino by
the rehabilitation clinic, Merrill also felt it necessary and prudent to write to
the casino himself and ask to be excluded if he ever entered the casino and
attempted to gamble.17 There is no doubt that the casino was made aware
of Merrill's compulsive gambling status and his wishes regarding the status
of his entry to '1the
casino; his name was unmistakably listed on the casino's
"eviction list. 8
Much like many other compulsive gamblers, and for that matter, much
like any person addicted to anything, Merrill's will was not as strong as his
addiction. In 1998, Merrill succumbed to his addiction and went back to
the casino.' 9 Regardless of all advance warning the casino had regarding
Merrill's addiction to gambling and his wishes to never gamble at the
casino again, the casino allowed him to enter the premises and lose a
substantial amount of money. 20 After suffering his losses, Merrill turned to
the streets to provide him with money to survive. 2' Although it was not
relevant to the issues decided in the current case, after losing his money
Merrill ended up robbing banks in December of 1998 and January of 1999.
As a result, he was convicted and is serving time in a federal prison.22
14.
Merrill, 320 F.3d at 731.
15.
Id.
16.
Id. Apparently, however, even though Merrill believed that this "contract" was
being made, it was discovered during trial that the clinic had actually never entered into any
type of contract, oral or written, with the casino regarding this matter. Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id. Merrill wrote to the casino in 1996 and asked to be excluded from the list.
Id. At the time of his relapse in 1998, the Indiana Administrative Regulation that requires
that casinos maintain an eviction list was not in effect. That regulation did not come into
effect until 2000. Id. at 732. However, it is undisputed that the casino did know that Merrill
was a compulsive gambler and that he wanted to be excluded from the casino, and as such,
as the rest of this argument will set out, the casino should have had a common law duty to
keep Merrill out of the casino. Merrill's situation differs from the situation contemplated by
this comment. This comment deals with compulsive gamblers who have explicitly placed
their names on a self-exclusion list. Thus, in the situation contemplated by this comment,
the argument for a duty bears much more weight because the casino has actual knowledge of
the gambler's desires.
19.
Merrill,320 F.3d at 731.
20.
See id.
21.
See id. at 730.
Id. This is mentioned to foreshadow one of the matters this comment will
22.
discuss later, namely that compulsive gambling is an addiction that is very harmful to
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Turning to the main issue of this comment, the court in Merrill
concluded, albeit arguably in error, that the Trump Casino owed "no
statutory or contractual duty to Merrill. 23 Merrill's arguments were based,
for our purposes, on two theories: 1) "intentional and reckless disregard for
others' safety (willful and wanton misconduct), 24 and 2) negligence.. 5
Because the court found that the casino owed no duty to Merrill, 26 it found
that the casino could not have acted negligently or engaged in willful and
wanton misconduct.2 7
In discussing the possibility of a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, the
court surmised that even if the self-exclusion regulation had been in effect
at the time Merrill suffered his losses (his losses occurred in 1998 - the
regulations were not imposed until 2000), the drafters would not have
intended to create a private cause of action for a gambler against the
casino. 28 The court stated that the self-exclusion regulation only intended
to impose a duty on the casino "to the state through the gaming
commission. ' ' 29 In support of its holding, the court spoke of the legislative
history of the regulation.3 ° It noted that the legislature was silent on the
concept of civil liability under this particular regulation but did create
different administrative penalties that were to be enforced through the
gaming commission. 3' From that evidence, and from the fact that there are
substantial gaming regulations throughout the state, none of which create a
private cause of action for a scenario similar to Merrill's, the court deduced
that the Indiana Supreme Court would not have concluded that "the
legislature intended to create a private cause of action. 3 2 As will be
discussed later in the section regarding special relationships, this conclusion
is extremely illogical. It is illogical for a regulation to be put into force that
explicitly sets out a manner in which a patron can place himself on a selfexclusion list, 33 yet not provide a manner through which the person who is

society, not only in the sense that institutions such as banks may suffer, but that these
gamblers also pose a drain on the public fiscal system.
23.
Id. at 731.
24.
Merrill, 320 F.3d at 731.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.at 733.
27.
Id. at 731.
28.
Id. at 732.
29.
Merrill,320 F.3d at 732.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 732 ("Where state intensely regulated casinos without creating cause of
action, casino was not liable to plaintiff who suffered extensive gambling losses while
intoxicated." (citing Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal, 70 F.3d 291, 293-94 (3d Cir. 1995)).
33.
See, e.g., ILL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.750 (2005).
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attempting to benefit by the regulation (the gambler) can enforce the very
concept that it sets forth.34
The Merrill court then addressed the concept of whether the casino
owed a common law duty of care toward Merrill. 35 The court proceeded to
analogize Merrill's case to cases involving the duty of care that a tavern
owner owes to his patrons.3 6 The Merrill court found that no common law
duty of care should exist in Merrill's case because Indiana law states that a
tavern owner is not liable for injuries suffered by the actual patron to whom
the tavern owner served the alcohol.37 As will be established later, there are
a number of important differences between compulsive gamblers who are
on a casino's self-exclusion list and patrons who are intoxicated at a bar.
These distinctions, which the Merrill court failed to make, serve as the basis
for allowing a private cause of action in the compulsive gambling scenario
as opposed to the tavern scenario.
The Merrill case, holding that there is no private cause of action
against the casino, is typical of the litigation that surrounds this area of the
law.38 The courts seemed to be hesitant to create a cause of action because
the regulations in question do not normally state explicitly that there is a
private cause of action. 39 However, these courts do not take into account
the different societal and personal harms that occur4 ° due to the casinos'
failure to follow through with the expectation they place into the minds of
compulsive gamblers who come to them for help. It is one thing to deny a
cause of action against a casino that has not put forth any type of remedial
help for these compulsive gamblers. It is quite another to allow these
casinos to escape liability when they partake on a course of action through
which a reasonable person (albeit a reasonable compulsive gambler) would
believe that she has found a surefire way to kick her habit. 41 However,
inconsistent with what would be deemed the "morally right" way of solving

34.
See, e.g., Merrill, 320 F.3d at 732-33.
35.
Id. at 732.
36.
Id. at 733.
37.
Merrill, 320 F.3d at 733. In Indiana, a tavern owner can be liable to third
parties that the intoxicated patron injures while driving under the influence, but not to the
patron himself. Id.
38.
See, e.g., Stulajter v. Harrah's Ind. Corp., 808 N.E.2d 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
39.
See, e.g., 68 IND. ADMIN. CODE 6-3-1 (2005).
40.
See discussion infra notes 83-108.
41.
See, e.g., ILL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2005) (stating that licensees
shall not allow excluded persons to gamble, with the title of this section being "Duties of
Owner Licensees").
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this problem, the courts have been extremely reluctant to allow any type of
relief to the gambler.4 2
B.

STATE GAMING REGULATIONS

As hinted at above, public policy should play an important role in the
situations contemplated by this comment. However, public policy is not the
only factor involved. At issue in the typical compulsive gambler/selfexclusion scenarios are numerous regulations, which are usually enforced
by the state's gaming commission or other like entity.43 These regulations
establish the foundation for the rights, obligations, procedural processes,
remedies, and rewards, if any, for the casinos and the gamblers. 44 In order
to truly understand the logic behind the different courts' reasoning and the
arguments this comment makes, a more detailed look at the regulations is
necessary.
The only regulation quoted in the Merrill case was the regulation that
required Indiana casinos to maintain their own eviction list and to prevent
all persons on that list from entering the casino. 45 In pertinent part, that
regulation set forth as follows:
Sec. 1. (a) Each riverboat licensee shall maintain a list of
evicted persons. Such list shall be comprised of persons
who have been barred from a riverboat gaming operation
for reasons deemed necessary by the riverboat licensee.
(b) Each riverboat licensee shall submit internal control
procedures for both the eviction and the readmission of
evicted persons to the executive director.
(c) Each riverboat licensee shall have in place criteria for
evicting persons and placing persons on its eviction list. At
minimum, the eviction criteria shall include the following
behavior:...
(5) A person requests that his or her own name be placed
on the riverboat licensee's eviction list...
(d) Persons shall be placed on the eviction list for a time
period determined by the riverboat licensee. The time

42.
regulation
legislature
43.
44.
45.

See, e.g., Merrill, 320 F.3d at 732 (holding that "[g]iven the extent of gambling
. . . we conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court would not conclude that the
intended to create a private cause of action.").
See, e.g., ILL. ADMrN. CODE tit. 86, §§ 3000.700-.790 (2005).
Id.
320 F.3d at 732.
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period for the eviction may be for any period of time that is
not less than forty-eight (48) hours.4 6
C.

PROBLEMS WITH THE REGULATIONS

When viewed as a whole, it is a reasonable conclusion that a person
who places himself on the self-exclusion list would expect to be "evicted"
upon entering the casino.47 When read in conjunction with the portion of
the regulation discussing the enforcement of the voluntary exclusion list, it
is easy to see how a reasonable patron would expect to be excluded from
entering the premises.4 8 Even though all of these measures have been put
into place to attempt to evict the patron, and thus properly complete the
purpose of the regulations in general, the code specifically denies that "the
state, the commission, and its employees and agents" should be liable in
any manner to the patron. 49 In fact, although it may seem irrational enough
that the patron cannot attempt to place any liability on the casino, the
regulations go so far as to take away from the patron any amount of
winnings that he may have won before being found and excluded.5 ° Should
the voluntarily excluded individual be found to have entered the gaming
floor after being placed on the exclusion list, the regulation states that he
"agrees to forfeit any jackpot or thing of value won as a result of a wager
made at [the] facility" and return those winnings to the commission.5'
Thus, the regulations seem to establish that the casinos can "promise" to
exclude patrons placed on the self-exclusion list, yet if they are not so
excluded, not only do the patrons not have any right of enforcement against
the casino, they also have the additional detriment of not being able to keep
the money they actually won.5 2 In essence, the casinos dangle two carrots
46.
68 IND. ADMlN. CODE 6-2-1 (2005).
47.
See id.
48.
See 68 IND. ADMiN. CODE 6-3-3(a) (2005). This portion of the code states,
among other things, "The executive director or his or her designee shall maintain the
voluntary exclusion list, which shall contain the names and personal information of the
persons participating in the program. Such persons shall be excluded from gaming areasat
allfacilities under thejurisdiction of the commission." Id. (emphasis added).
49.
See 68 IND. ADMIN. CODE 6-3-2(d)(3) (2005). Curiously, this rule seems to
foreclose the concept of any type of liability for the state, gaming commission, and the
commission's employees and agents, yet does not specifically mention the liability of the
casino itself. See id. Since the casino itself is the actual entity that is in the habit of
enforcing the exclusion list, one might think that if the commission wanted to foreclose
liability against the casino it would have specifically put it into this regulation.
50.
See 68 IND. ADMIN. CODE 6-3-2(g)-(h) (2005).
51.
68 IND. ADMIN. CODE 6-3-2(g) (2005).
52.
See John Warren Kindt, "The Insiders"for Gambling Lawsuits: Are the Games
"Fair"and Will Casinos and Gambling FacilitiesBe Easy Targetsfor Blueprintsfor RICO
and Other Causes of Action?, 55 MERCER L. REv. 529, 544 (2004).
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(the promise of exclusion, or if not excluded, glory and riches) by a stick in
front of the patrons, giving them a false hope that they are being helped to
kick their habit, but, when they are unable to do so, the casinos hit them
with the stick and do not even have the decency of letting them keep the
carrot. As noted by one attorney, " 'while the program makes it clear that
gamblers who violate the ban may not keep their winnings, there is no
provision to return to them any money lost.' ,53 This, in effect, establishes
a "win-win" scenario for the casinos even though they did not follow
through with their exclusion duties imposed under the regulations to keep
compulsive gamblers from entering and placing bets in their casinos.5 4 It
would be logical for a patron to assume that he would have some type of
remedial action against the casino/gaming board since he placed himself on
a self-exclusion list and the casino/gaming board "agreed" to make sure he
is excluded. 55 However, as shown by the Merrill court, real life is not
always logical.56 Apparently, the only repercussions against 57the casino
seem to be sanctions by the appropriate administrative authority.
Illinois also has a number of regulations dealing with this matter. 8
However, Illinois seems to be slightly more gambler-friendly in terms of its
regulations. Whereas the Indiana Code specifically requires that the form
for registration of a self-excluded patron have a section denoting that the
state, commission and its agents are not to be held liable, 59 the Illinois
regulations only hold that "[s]uch forms may include a request to waive the
liability of the Board. ... ,
In addition, instead of simply taking the
money that the patron has won in violation of his exclusion agreement and
giving it to the commission, Illinois has deemed that the money should be
put to good use and allows the patron to select a registered charitable or
governmental agency that provides help for compulsive gamblers to which
she can donate her winnings.6 1
Even though the regulations do allow for more friendly treatment of
compulsive gamblers, they still put forth the same types of problems that

53.
Id.
54.
Id. This philosophy, and the quotations in note 54, stems from Gaming
Commission regulations in Missouri, but the same philosophy applies in all states, much like
Illinois and Indiana, which have similar gaming regulations.
55.
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2005).
56.
See Merrill, 320 F.3d at 732 (stating that there is no "private cause of action
against nonconforming casinos.").
57.
Id. Such sanctions could include fines and the revocation of the casino's
gaming license. See also 68 IND. ADMIN. CODE 13-1-1 to 13-1-22 (2005).
58.
See ILL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 86, §§ 3000.700-.790 (2005).
59.
68 IND. ADMIN. CODE 6-3-2(d)(3) (2005).
60.
ILL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.755(c) (2005) (emphasis added).
61.
ILL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.756(b) (2005).
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are inherent in the Indiana regulations.6 2 Exactly like the Indiana
regulations, the Illinois regulations state that "[n]o licensee shall knowingly
allow any person placed on the Self-Exclusion List... to enter the gaming
63
premises of, or engage in gambling at, the riverboat gaming operation.,
Yet, again, the regulations fail to provide for any remedial measure of
action against the casino for employing this harsh "punishment without
reward" situation. 64 Even though the casinos may be liable to the Gaming
Commission of the appropriate state for allowing excluded persons to enter
the casinos,65 those penalties, which are paid by the casinos, are apparently
not high enough to persuade the casinos to follow through with the actions
they have pledged to take through their self-exclusion regulations. 66 There
are a number of different reasons that a casino, even facing these
disciplinary measures, would choose not to evict a self-excluded person.
One reason is shown by the Indiana regulation itself. As stated before, in
Indiana, should a self-excluded person be found gambling in one of the
casinos she asked to be excluded from, the person agrees to "forfeit any
jackpot or thing of value won as a result of a wager" and "[t]he forfeited
jackpots or items will be withheld by the riverboat licensee or operating
agent and remitted to the commission. ,67 Logic would possibly suggest
that the more money the commission receives as remitted funds, the more
lenient that commission may be when enforcing sanctions on the casino in
violation of the self-exclusion regulations.68
In addition there is a much more pragmatic, and to some, even more
disturbing, reason that casinos' efforts to find and evict self-excluded
persons are relaxed: the vast majority of casino revenue comes from

62.

Compare ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, §§ 3000.700-.790 (2005) with 68 IND.

ADMIN. CODE 6-1-1 to 6-3-5 (2005).

63.
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2005).
64.
Kathy Gilroy, a member of the Rockford-based Coalition Against Legalized
Gambling states: " '[uinder the proposed policy, (the casinos are) not really attempting to
find [the self-excluded gamblers] until they win money, . . . and there's no penalty at all for
the casino for letting people lose money.' " Peter Collins & Joseph Kelly, Problem
Gambling and Self-Exclusion: A Report to the South African Responsible Gambling Trust, 6
GAMING L. REv. 517, 524 (2002).
65.
See Merrill, 320 F.3d at 732. The penalties incurred by the casino can take a
number of different forms. As stated by the Merrill court, the current rules, at least under
the Indiana regulations provide for "administrative and disciplinary hearings, as well as
sanctions against casinos, including fines and rescindment of licenses." Id.
66.
If the penalties were high enough, there would be no basis for this comment.
67.
68 IND. ADMiN. CODE 6-3-2(g) (2005). This regulation also purports to state
the logic behind this forfeiture and remission as a "fine levied against the voluntarily
excluded individual" for succumbing to his compulsive gambling order and entering the
casino. Id.
68.
See Kindt, supranote 52, at 545.
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compulsive gamblers. 69 One study found that anywhere from twenty-seven
percent to fifty-five percent of all revenue taken in by a casino stems from
compulsive gamblers. 70 This figure is astonishing by itself, but when taken
in context of the amount of money actually brought in by a casino, perhaps
the true motivation behind the casinos' relaxed eviction methods is shown.
For example, Harrah's Entertainment, Inc., which is one of the largest
casino operations in the entire country, received roughly $4,077,694,000 in
casino revenue alone in 2004. 7 ' Once calculated, the amount of money
Harrah's reeled in from compulsive gamblers in 2004 ranges from
$1,100,977,380 to $2,242,731,700. In Nevada, home to one of the
country's largest gaming cities, Las Vegas, the total amount won in the
aggregate by the casinos in the 2005 fiscal year was upwards of $11
billion.72 Keeping in mind that the figures mentioned above are just for one
corporation and one city, the true motive behind a casino's relaxed effort
towards exclusion of compulsive gamblers is revealed. When viewed as a
whole, the numbers are astonishing: in 1993, the "U.S. public legally
wagered $394.3 billion. . . . In that same year, the amount of money
actually "won" by legalized gambling operations amounted to nearly $34.7
billion.74 The problem is thus one of massive proportion.
While the self-exclusion regulations do seem to differ from state to
state in terms of such things as how a gambler can apply, the length of the
exclusion period,75 the manner in which a patron can remove himself from
the exclusion list, etc.,76 the gist of each regulation appears to be the same.
The gist is that the casinos agree to do everything in their power to keep the
69.
One group of researchers reported that problem gamblers alone, exclusive of all
other gamblers, account for almost half of the nation's annual $51 billion gambling loss.
Nat'l Endowment for Fin. Educ. & Nat'l Council on Problem Gambling, PROBLEM
GAMBLERS AND THEIR FINANCES: A GUIDE FOR TREATMENT PROFESSIONALS 6 (2000) at
http://www.ncpgambling.org/media/pdf/problem-gamblersfinances.pdf.
70.
Kindt, supra note 52, at 545.
71.
Harrah's Entertainment, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 43 (2004).
72.
Nev. Gaming Comm'n and State Gaming Control Bd., 2005 INFORMATION
SHEET, http://gaming.nv.gov/gamefact05.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005). This information
appears to represent only the amount taken in by casinos in Nevada, and does not represent
the total amount actually wagered by patrons for the fiscal year ending June 2005.
73.
John Warren Kindt, U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic Base:
The Business/Economic Impacts of the Legalization of Gambling Activities, 39 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 567, 572 (1995) [hereinafter Economic Base].
74.
Id.
75.
For example, in Illinois, the minimum amount of time one can be placed on the
list is five years. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.780(a) (2005). Contrarily, in Missouri,
once one is on the exclusion list one is on it for life. See Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 4517.050 (2005).
76.
Compare 68 IND. ADMIN. CODE 6-3-1 (2005) with ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86. §
3000.700 (2005).
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compulsive gambler from the premises, but should they fail in this regard,
the gambler is forced to bear his losses, release his winnings,77 and even
subject himself to possible arrest for trespass. 78 All of this occurs just
because the patron pleads with the casino to help him overcome his
addictive habit. In addition, not having civil liability seems contrary to the
vast majority of
the language of the statutes. 79 When the statute says that
"no licensee" 80 shall allow a self-excluded person to "engage in
gambling" 8' at the casino, it is logical to infer that the statute actually
means that no self-excluded person shall be allowed to gamble. If the
casino fails in this regard, it is logical to assume that the casino breached its
"duty" to the patron.
D.

COMPULSIVE GAMBLING AS AN ADDICTION/DISEASE

In order to correctly apply the analyses of this comment, it is necessary
to know exactly what constitutes compulsive gambling. Compulsive
gambling is a problem that has plagued the world since the inception of
gambling. One may ask how exactly "compulsive gambling" is defined.
According to the National Council on Problem Gambling ("NCPG"), a
council that was implemented to help problem gamblers and their families
cope with gambling disorders and is neither for nor against legalized82
gambling, "compulsive gambling" is a subset of "problem gambling.
The definition of "problem gambling" as set out by the NCPG is as follows:
Problem gambling is gambling behavior which causes
disruptions in any major area of life: psychological,
physical, social or vocational. The term "Problem
Gambling" includes, but is not limited to, the condition
known as "Pathological", or "Compulsive" Gambling, a
progressive addiction characterized by increasing
preoccupation with gambling, a need to bet more money
more frequently, restlessness or irritability when attempting
to stop, "chasing" losses, and loss of control manifested by
continuation of the gambling behavior in spite of mounting,
serious, negative consequences.83

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.756 (2005).
E.g., MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 45-17.020 (2005).
See, e.g., ILL. ADMrN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2005).
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770(a) (2005).
Id.
National Council on Problem Gambling, supra note 1.
Id.
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That definition invokes the true feelings, emotions, and urges that are
felt by anyone who has, or shares a close relationship with someone who
has, a compulsive gambling disorder. The results of a compulsive
gambling disorder can be disastrous not only to the gambler himself but
also to the gambler's close friends and relatives.84
Gambling is an activity that is participated in all across the country.
Gambling activity has been legalized, at least in some manner, in fortyeight states plus the District of Columbia.85 The only two states that do not
allow for legalized gambling are Hawaii and Utah.86 The fact that gambling
is so widespread brings even more emphasis to the fact that there is a need
to help compulsive gamblers.
In addition to being spread all across the nation, the gambling industry
According to the NCPG,
affects the lives of almost everyone.
approximately 85% of all United States adults have gambled at some point
and time in their lives, and 60% have done some type of gambling in the
last year.87 Looking at these figures, one could assume that almost every
family in the United States is, at some point and time, subjected to the
gambling world, either through their own actions or the actions of a family
member. Thus, the effect of gambling is felt on a vast portion of United
States society.
Problem and compulsive gambling are rather common occurrences in
the United States as well. It is estimated that there are approximately two
million compulsive gamblers in the United States.88 In addition to that
figure, it is estimated that there are anywhere between four and eight
million problem gamblers in the United States.89
To understand the true nature of compulsive gambling, a look at its
Pathological
psychological effects and requirements is necessary.
gambling9" is categorized by the American Psychiatric Association

84.
For instance, "an increasing number of suicides," which undoubtedly affect
members of the deceased's family, have been "directly linked to pathological gambling."
Kindt, supra note 52, at 540.
85.
National Council on Problem Gambling, supra note 1.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
National Council on Problem Gambling, supra note 1. Persons defined as
problem gamblers are those that "do not meet the full diagnostic criteria for pathological
gambling, but meet one of more of the criteria and are experiencing problems due to their
gambling behavior." Id. Even though they do not technically meet the full criteria for being
defined as a "compulsive gambler," these people still seem to have enough problems that
they may be in need of use of the self-exclusion procedures and principles outlined above.
Pathological gambling and compulsive gambling are essentially the same thing,
90.
and this comment will use the terms interchangeably.
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("APA") as an impulse-control disorder. 91 The APA denotes that the
"essential feature of Pathological Gambling is persistent and recurrent
maladaptive gambling behavior. . .that disrupts personal, family, or
vocational pursuits. 92 The APA, which is one of the country's leading
associations on mental illnesses, through its own definition, concretely
points out that pathological gambling is not a disease that is confined
simply to the gambler, but instead places a burden on the lives of those who
have a close relationship with the gambler.93 The APA lists ten distinct
criteria that can be used to determine whether or not a person has a
pathological gambling problem. 94 These criteria serve as the basis of what
goes through the mind of a pathological gambler, i.e., why they feel the
need to gamble and why they have trouble resisting this need.95
The reasoning behind a pathological gambler's need to gamble is
distinctly set out in the criteria developed by the APA. 96 The reason that
these individuals gamble, even after they have lost more than they can
91.

See

AMERICAN

PSYCHIATRIC

ASSOCIATION,

th
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 671 (4 ed., text rev. 2000).

92.
93.
94.

DIAGNOSTIC

AND

STATISTICAL

Id.
See id.
Id. at 674. The ten criteria are as follows:
Persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior as indicated by
five (or more) of the following:
(1) is preoccupied with gambling (e.g., preoccupied with
reliving past gambling experiences, handicapping or planning
the next venture, or thinking of ways to get money with which
to gamble)
(2) needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in
order to achieve the desired excitement
(3) has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or
stop gambling
(4) is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop
gambling
(5) gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of
relieving a dysphoric mood (e.g., feelings of helplessness,
guilt, anxiety, depression)
(6) after losing money gambling, often returns another day to
get even ("chasing" one's losses)
(7) lies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the
extent of involvement with gambling
(8) has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or
embezzlement to finance gambling
(9) has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or
educational or career opportunity because of gambling
(10) relies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate
financial situation caused by gambling
See id. at 671-74.
See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 91, at 671.
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afford, is because they are trying to achieve a "high" that can only be
realized through gambling. 97 The APA classifies this high as an "aroused,
euphoric state. 9 8 The most important criterion, at least for the purpose of
this comment, is laid out in criterion A3 of the APA's diagnostic criteria for
pathological gambling. 99 That criterion states that individuals who have a
gambling problem continue to gamble despite, "repeated. . .efforts to
control, cut back, or stop..." the behavior.' ° This criterion, in essence,
establishes that these types of people do not have the ability to control their
gambling actions, regardless of whether they want to or not. In short,
pathological gambling is an addiction, much like the 02
addiction to
nicotine,' °1 in which the person has no choice but to continue. 1
E.

THE SOCIETAL EFFECTS OF COMPULSIVE GAMBLING

There is no doubt that alcohol abuse and the abuse of other substances
is a part of our society. What one may not understand, however, is that
compulsive gambling plays just as large of a role in our society as these
other abuses. 10 3 One estimate, established in 1988, pegged the national
societal costs of alcohol abuse at roughly $120 billion and the costs of other
substance abuses at $60 billion.' 4 By comparison, that same study pegged
97.
See id.
98.
Id. Most of us who go to the casino but do not have a pathological gambling
condition go to the casino for one main reason: to make money. Pathological gamblers, on
the other hand, are not nearly as concerned with winning money as they are with achieving
the euphoric state that they get from gambling. Id. This is probably the main distinction
between a compulsive gambler and those people in society who are not afflicted with this
horrible, and sometimes deadly, disease. Pathological gamblers tend to have relatively high
rates of "suicidal ideation and suicide attempts." Id. at 672. Thus, this addiction constitutes
not only an economic problem for the individual, but it also poses a significant safety and
welfare problem for society as a whole.
99.
Id. at 674.
100.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssocIATION, supra note 91, at 674.
101.
Nicotine addiction and compulsive gambling share many of the same
characteristics.
For example, substance (nicotine) addiction, much like compulsive
gambling, can be characterized by a "need for markedly increased amounts of the substance
to achieve intoxication or desired effect" and "a persistent desire or unsuccessful effort[] to
cut down or control substance use." Id. at 197.
102.
See id. The fact that this criterion is mentioned as the most important in no way
belittles the importance of the other criteria. Just as important for the problem addressed by
this comment is criterion six, which states "[p]ersistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling
behavior as indicated by five (or more) of the following: . . . (6) after losing money
gambling, often returns another day to get even ("chasing" one's losses) .
I..."
Id. at 674.
This criterion, in combination with criterion three, mentioned above, makes it easy to see
how a pathological gambler continues to have problems associated with her addiction even
though he attempts to stop.
103.
See Economic Base, supra note 73, at 584.
104.
Id.
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the societal costs of compulsive gambling at $80 billion. 10 5 When these
numbers are compared to the amount of money actually "won" by the
casinos, it becomes obvious that, even from an economic standpoint, the
country is losing out. 0 6 The pure economic viewpoint, however, fails to
and hardship that compulsive gamblers and their
take into account the pain
07
endure.
must
families
II.

COMPULSIVE GAMBLING AND INTOXICATION LAWS

This comment's first argument for a duty to evict to be placed on the
casino begins with the similarities and differences between gambling and
intoxication. Since the beginning of the litigation of voluntary selfexclusion cases, the courts have attempted to compare and contrast the
differences between compulsive gambling related injuries and state dramshop'0 8 laws.' 0 9 The majority of courts have found that since most states do
not allow an intoxicated patron that has suffered injuries to recover from the
tavern that served him alcohol, a compulsive gambler should not be allowed
to recover from the casino that allowed him to gamble." 10 These courts are,
in essence, comparing the compulsive gambler's situation to the situation
where a dnmk injures himself in a car accident after leaving a tavern."'
However, as will be addressed, there are a number of distinctions between
these two types of situations.
When "failure to evict" claims are brought, the compulsive gambler
normally tries to analogize his claim to fit within a state's dram-shop
105.
Id.
106.
Compare the costs to society of compulsive gambling in 1988 ($80 billion),
Economic Base, supra note 73, at 584, with the amount of money actually brought in by the
casino ($34.7 billion), id. at 572. When compared, these numbers reflect one of the hidden
problems of compulsive gambling: even though gambling may be beneficial to certain
establishments, the cost that society has to bear due to compulsive gambling is more than
twice the monetary gain of the nation as a whole.
A general demographic survey was conducted from January 1, 2000 through
107.
March 21, 2002 during which 184 of the 294 gamblers who had put themselves on a selfexclusion list at the Mohegan Sun Casino responded. The survey showed that the average
age of the self-excluded gambler was 41; 60% were male, 76% were Caucasian, and 33%
had a household income between $35,000 and $59,000. 35% had income over $60,000.
Astonishingly, the "average loss.. .was $26,133." Collins and Kelly, supranote 64, at 520.
108.
Dram shop laws, in general, "impose a duty upon tavern owners to patrons and
third persons sustaining injuries resulting from the tavern's negligent service of alcohol to
visibly intoxicated customers." Jessica L. Krentzman, Dram Shop Law - Gambling While
Intoxicated.- The Winner Takes it All? The Third CircuitExamines a Casino's Liabilityfor
Allowing a Patronto Gamble While Intoxicated, 41 ViLE. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (1996).
109.
See Merrill, 320 F.3d at 733. See also Stulajter v. Harrah's Indiana Corp., 808
N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (following Merrill).
110.
See Merrill,320 F.3d at 733.
111.
See id
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laws."12 Under traditional dram-shop law, a duty is created vis-A-vis a
tavern owner and a patron when the tavern owner serves alcohol to a patron
who is obviously intoxicated.1 3 Under this traditional legislation, once the
duty is created the tavern owner would be liable for "injuries proximately
caused by the patron if the duty is breached."' " 4 The rationale behind this
theory is that the bartender is in the best position to avoid the foreseeable
harm that may arise by serving an intoxicated patron more alcohol because
the bartender, unlike the patron, is not in a state of intoxication.115 This
rationale, which is very persuasive and extremely logical, has been softened
to some extent. Some states, including Indiana, the state in which Merrill v.
Trump Indiana, Inc. took place, have held that dram shop liability only
extends to third parties that are injured by the intoxicated patron's
conduct. 116 The logic behind this rationale is, in essence, that the proximate
cause of the patron's injuries is not the selling of the liquor, but rather the
drinking of it. 1 7 When applied strictly to alcohol consumption, this logic
makes sense.
A.

DISTINGUISHING DRAM SHOP LIABILITY FROM POTENTIAL
COMPULSIVE GAMBLER LIABILITY

When applied to compulsive gambling, the rationale for not holding a
tavern operator liable to the patron himself does not carry as much weight
due to important differences between the two situations.' 8 When
comparing the situations of a compulsive gambler and an alcoholic being
served by a tavern owner, it must be remembered that they are being fed
two different, yet extremely similar substances: alcohol for the alcoholic,
112.
Joy Wolfe, Comment, Casinos and the Compulsive Gambler:Is There a Duty to
Monitorthe Gambler's Wagers?, 64 Miss. L.J. 687, 696 (1995).
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
116.
See Merrill, 320 F.3d at 733 (citing Davis v. Stinson, 508 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987)). In Davis, the court held that a patron who was served alcohol at a social
function, drove drunk, and died in an automobile accident could not recover from his social
host. See Davis, 508 N.E.2d at 68. The court stated that even though the defendant socialhost might have been guilty of willful and wanton misconduct for serving the plaintiff while
he was visibly intoxicated, the plaintiff's driving the automobile was also willful and wanton
misconduct, thus providing the defendant with a complete defense to the claim. Id.at 67-68.
117.
See Julia A. Harden, Dramshop Liability: Should the Intoxicated Person
Recover for His Own Injuries?,48 OHIO ST. L.J. 227, 228 (1987).
118.
In Harrah'sClub v. Van Blitter, 1988 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18348, at *6, the court
refused to hold a casino liable for a gambler's debts. However, the court then stated that the
casino, "[H]ad no knowledge of [plaintiff's] marital discord; nor is there any evidence
showing any intent to profitfrom a demonstrable psychological weakness." Id.(emphasis
added). This could be read as a signal by the court that a psychological weakness, such as
gambling, could be a viable reason for imposing a duty upon the casino.
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and credit for the compulsive gambler. 19 The two situations are analogous
because in both situations, the individual20has lost much of his ability to
effectively make reasoned, sound choices.
As mentioned, the finding of "no duty" on the part of a tavern owner
seems to rest partly on the concept of proximate cause.' 21 In the tavern
situation, the patron drinking the liquor is seen to essentially be a
supervening cause, thus removing the bartender from the equation. 2 2 The
tavern owner situation, however, is not truly analogous to the self-excluded
compulsive gambler situation. The first distinction has to do with the
proximity of the damage caused to the patron/gambler and the issuance of
the liquor, or in the compulsive gambler's case, the credit extended to him.
In the tavern situation, the patron drinks the liquor, gets in the car, drives
drunk and hits someone.123 The patron thus receives the dangerous
substance, drinks it, and then normally must do another physical act (such
as driving) before the harm occurs. The compulsive gambling situation,
however, is not so far attenuated. The harm (i.e., the psychological effects
compulsive gamblers endure and the financial burden of losing money they
cannot afford to lose) from compulsive gambling comes at the moment that
casino. 24 Thus, the
the dangerous substance is "fed" to them by the 125
down.
breaks
proximate cause portion of the analysis
The next factor that distinguishes the self-excluded compulsive
gambler from the dram shop scenario that was evinced in Merrill is the
concept of foreseeability 26 The justification for holding the bartender
liable in a dram shop situation is premised on the notion that the bartender
119.
In one case, a woman filed a lawsuit against a casino for allowing her husband
to gamble even though the casino knew he was a problem gambler. The casino kept feeding
him credit, and in the end, he ended up losing everything and killing himself. The plaintiff's
attorney made the statement: "In [plaintiff's] case, just replace drinks with virtually
unlimited credit. Feeding [plaintiff] credit was the equivalent of feeding him alcohol."
Kindt, supra note 52, at 541, 542.
120.
Compare AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 91, at 671 (stating

behavioral characteristics

of compulsive gambling), with

AMERICAN

PSYCHIATRIC

supra note 91, at 217 (stating alcohol intoxication can cause impaired
judgment and impaired social functioning).
121.
See Harden, supranote 117, at 228.
See id.
122.
123.
This is the typical situation under which current dram shop litigation takes
place. However, there are obviously other scenarios that could happen, some more
attenuated than others.
The harm from compulsive gambling is the loss of the money itself.
124.
Since there is no intervening "act" before damage is caused, the casino allowing
125.
the patron to gamble must be directly linked to the harm caused. In essence, the actual
extension of the credit (compared to the serving of liquor) is when the harm occurs because
it is at that moment that the casino has broken its "promise" to evict the gambler. The harm
in the tavern scenario does not occur until the patron leaves and injures a third party.
126.
Merrill,320 F.3d at 733.
ASSOCIATION,
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"is in the best position to avoid the foreseeable harm by refusing to serve
the intoxicated patron."'' 27 One argument that has been made is that in the
tavern scenario, the bartender has the ability to see the person and
determine when he is intoxicated, and, thus, has the ability to stop serving
him.' 28 Therefore, it is argued, that the bartender has a "reasonably
objective standard, that of visible intoxication," to determine when he
should stop serving the patron. 29 The argument goes on to say that the
situation is not the same in a compulsive gambling scenario because30there is
no outward physical manifestation of the "harm" that is occurring.'
Even though that argument may hold water for a typical compulsive
gambler, in the case of a self-excluded compulsive gambler, the argument
weakens. Once a patron places himself on the voluntary exclusion list, the
casino is aware that any gambling by the patron will bring harm upon him,
as that was the reason the patron placed himself on the list in the first
place.13 ' Once one recognizes that the casino knows a person is a
compulsive gambler, then the two situations put forth a rhetorical question:
which is the more easily identifiable, "objective" standard through which to
determine the foreseeabilty of harm - 1) the eyes of a bartender to
determine if someone is on the brink of intoxication, 32 or 2) the actual
documented knowledge of a casino that a patron is a compulsive
gambler? 33 The casino, having knowledge of the situation and of the
gambler's addiction, 34 has "an opportunity by reasonable care to avoid the
injury."' 135 If they do not exercise 36that care and exclude the patron, then
what is the point of the regulation?
127.
Wolfe, supra note 112, at 696.
128.
Id. at 697.
129.
Id.
130.
See id.
131.
The statutes, such as ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.700 et seq. (2005), were
enacted for the very purpose of stopping this type of harm to the patron. See also ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.705 (2005) ("The Board shall provide a procedure whereby a
person who acknowledges that he or she has a gambling problem may self-identify and selfexclude himself or herself from Illinois riverboat gaming operations.").
132.
It is common knowledge that some people may be completely intoxicated and
show no signs of it at all.
133.
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.755 (2005) (setting forth the information
needed to be placed on a form to correctly exclude oneself from an Illinois casino).
134.
In the Hakimoglu case, Justice Becker stated that he believed that the New
Jersey Supreme Court would "recognize a cause of action, in tort, allowing patrons to
recover gambling debts from casinos that serve them alcohol after they are visibly
intoxicated." Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1995)
(Becker, J., dissenting). Once it is established that alcohol is to an alcoholic what credit is to
a compulsive gambler, this statement applies to the self-excluded compulsive gambling
scenario as well.
135.
Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1961). The Galvin case held that,
in contrast to the dram shop cases mentioned above, a tavern patron who was served alcohol
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THE ABILITY TO EXCLUDE

One of the last justifications put forth by the casinos, as a defense to a
suit brought by a patron, is that it would be extremely difficult for the
casino to find and evict these patrons. 137 However, even assuming that this
would have been particularly burdensome on casinos in the past, it is not
nearly as burdensome today. The advent of new electronic surveillance
equipment significantly reduces the possible burden that this may have on a
casino. 138
The breadth and sophistication of current casino surveillance systems
is mind-boggling. Today, casinos have the ability to "recognize" you as
soon as you come in the door. 139 The introduction of face recognition
technology has greatly facilitated the ease with which a casino can track
who enters and exits its premises.140 In addition to merely recognizing
those patrons who the casino itself has designated as evictees, the Casino
Information Network allows the casino to link with a "large private
biometric database of shared pictures in order to identify cheats recently
Once there is a match between the image
evicted from area casinos.''
captured by the surveillance equipment and the database, the system
operator is alerted to the presence of the individual.1 42 Thus, it is easily
conceivable that a casino with a self-exclusion list would have knowledge
after he was visibly intoxicated and was subsequently injured in an automobile accident
could bring a suit against the tavern owner for his own injuries. See id.
One attorney representing the plaintiffs in a Michigan lawsuit based on the same
136.
principles embodied in this argument was quoted as saying: "[w]hat's the purpose for the
form? For the law?" Wendy N. Davis, Gambling on Casino Cases Compulsive Rollers Are
Suing the House, Betting That Courts Will Find Casinos Liable, 90 A.B.A. J. 18, at 18, 20,
(2004).
137.
See Wolfe, supra note 112, at 693 (stating that a court judge apparently believed
that "to accept the position advanced by the gambler [to require the casino to locate and evict
an excluded person] would place an impossible burden on the casino industry to identify and
control compulsive gamblers").
138.
See Kindt, supra note 52, at 536. There are literally thousands of surveillance
cameras and other devices in each casino to videotape the movement and placement of every
"chip, slot machine, employee, customer, and area of the gambling facility..."Id.
139.
See Robert H. Thornburg, Comment, Face Recognition Technology: The
Potential Orwellian Implications and Constitutionality of Current Uses Under the Fourth
Amendment, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 321, 328 (2002).

See id. The New York, New York Hotel & Casino, located in Las Vegas, has
140.
been using face recognition technology since its opening in 1997. As of 2001, there were
over ninety casinos in Las Vegas utilizing face recognition technology. Its use has not been
limited to the multi-billion dollar casinos either; even the small Native American casinos
employ this technology. Id.
141.
Id.at 328.
142.
Steven G. Brandl, Back to the Future: The Implications of September 11, 2001
on Law Enforcement PracticeandPolicy, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 133, 149 (2003).
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that an excluded gambler
had entered the casino even before the patron
143
placed his first bet.
In addition to face recognition technology, casinos also rely heavily on
their surveillance cameras to track chips and players.'44 With the thousands
of cameras that have been installed 145 in virtually every casino and the
hundreds of workers that are employed by the casino, it is hard to fathom
that a casino would not be able to locate a documented, self-excluded
gambler before he loses a great deal of money.146 Casinos also have the
ability to track that comes into their casino through the use of "Player's
cards."' 14 7 Most of these cards are given to the patrons 148 as a result of their
enrolling in the casino's "slot club."' 49 These cards allow the casinos to
keep a database profile of each and every user to determine how much they
spend, and what games they spend it on. 50 This allows the casino to tailor
its marketing to the individual gambler.' 51 Regardless of whether or not
this type of information retrieval is right or wrong, it does provide another
method through which a casino should
be immediately aware that a self52
casino.1
the
in
is
gambler
excluded
Surveillance that is good enough to catch compulsive gamblers before
they play, however, does not have to be extremely expensive. In fact, the
143.
See id.
144.
See Kindt, supranote 52, at 536.
145.
Casinos spend an enormous amount of money on their surveillance system to
render them state-of-the-art in order to keep track of their money, and more importantly, the
people who enter and leave the casino. One estimate places the amount of money spent on a
single surveillance system at over $700,000. Alan W. Zajic, ManagingLiability in Gaming
Operations:Surveillance, 8 GAMING L. REv. 260, 264 (2004).
146.
One justice, noting the degree of surveillance placed at any time on a patron,
stated: "[g]amblers... are constantly monitored by a dealer, floor persons, a pit boss, hidden
cameras, and sometimes even officials of the ... Casino Control Commission." Hakimoglu
v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 297-98 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting).
147.
See S.C. Gwynne, The Gambling Industry is CreatingHigh-Tech Databasesto
Reel in Compulsive Players,TIME, Nov. 17, 1997, at 68.
148.
One may argue that since the players are not always given these cards, or forced
to use them, the casino should not be required to use them as a monitoring device. However,
it is apparent that casinos do in fact use these cards to track their players. See id. Therefore,
it would not significantly burden the casinos to force them to pay attention to who is using
the cards. In addition, it would be an excellent device to locate a compulsive gambler due to
the vast amount of patrons that actually have these cards. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc.
alone, for example, has six million card holders. Id.
149.
See id. The incentives for enrolling in these slot clubs and allowing the casino
to track your habits come from accumulating "points" based on how much money you
spend. These points can be used for things such as free rooms, meals, or even cash. Id.
150.
See id.
151.
See S.C. Gwynne, The Gambling Industry is Creating High-Tech Databases to
Reel in Compulsive Players, TIME, Nov. 17, 1997, at 68.
152.
See id.
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regulations of most states require surveillance equipment to be in place
before a casino can open its doors. 5 3 With the addition of enough
personnel, training, and perhaps photographs of evicted/excluded persons,
the simple security cameras that are required by statute to be installed
would probably be sufficient to track these gamblers. A possible solution
to increase the chances of catching compulsive gamblers would be to
require, by statute, each casino to implement a face-recognition system by a
certain proposed date, for example, 2008. This would give the casinos the
time they need to raise the funds necessary for purchasing the equipment,
but would also help, in the long run, to prevent self-excluded gamblers from
gambling. Additionally, the simplest, cheapest, and most logical solution
requires no technology at all - simply require casino personnel to check the
identification card of every person who enters the casino to determine if
they are on the self-exclusion list. While this may have the effect of
creating longer lines to enter the casino, the benefits of checking
identification cards are two-fold and worth the detriment: it makes it very
easy to catch self-excluded gamblers, and it makes it very easy to catch
underage gamblers. In fact, Illinois has recently implemented a program
that will require all riverboat casinos in the state to check the identification
cards of all patrons who appear to be under the age of 30.114 While this is a
step in the right direction, more still needs to be done since it is estimated
that 55over 90% of all patrons on the self-exclusion list in Illinois are over

30.

Casinos are preying upon compulsive gamblers who are very much
like alcoholics. 5 6 The casinos are exploiting the gambler's disease for their
personal gain.' 57 The casino is in the best position to prevent the harm
these people suffer, and as such, should be held responsible when they fail
to take the necessary action.
III. THE DESHANEY ANALOGY
The second premise for imposing a duty (and liability) on the casino is
that by allowing the gambler to place himself on the self-exclusion list the
patron and the casino enter into a "special relationship," under which the

153.
See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.800-.860 (2005). These regulations
go so far as to regulate the number of lines of resolution each security camera must have.
(minimum 400 plus line resolution). Id.
154.
See Chris Fusco, Illinois Casinos to Check IDs for Addicts, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
June 23, 2006, at 18.
155.

156.
157.

See id.

See Kindt, supra note 52, at 545.
Id.
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casino has a duty to reasonably carry out the promises it has made. 5 8 The
argument is that by allowing the patron to place himself on the exclusion
list, the casino has placed into the gambler's mind the idea that he will be
excluded from entering the casino, and will thus never have to worry about
his gambling problem again.15 9 This could, in reality, effectively stop the
patron from attempting to seek help elsewhere for his addiction. 160
This argument focuses centrally on the idea that "special relationships"
can be created between two parties. 161 These relationships, once created,
give rise to an affirmative duty162 on the part of one party to act reasonably
for the care of the other, even though in the absence of any "special
relationship" there would be no duty. One example of when this duty
would arise is when someone undertakes to render services to someone
(even though they were not obliged to) and does so in a negligent
165
fashion.'64 Turning to the situations that are the subject of this comment,
this "special relationship" is created through the enforcement of the
administrative regulations. 66 The regulations, through their language and
subsequent enforcement 167 (or lack thereof), instill the idea in the patron's
mind that
she will be effectively excluded should she attempt to enter the
68
casino.

The question of whether a duty exists is one that is to be determined
by the courts. 169 A vast number of courts have found that a duty, and
subsequent liability for breaching that duty, may arise from the negligent
158.
(1989).
159.

See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201-02
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2005).

160.
See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161.
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 56 (5th ed.
1984) (discussing "special relationships" which may bring about affirmative duties to act
under tort law).
162.
A duty is defined as "[a] legal obligation that is owed or due to another and that
needs to be satisfied.. ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 409 (8th ed. 2000).

163.
See KEETON, supra note 161, §56, at 378 (stating that "if the defendant does
attempt to aid him, and takes charge and control of the situation, he is regarded as entering
voluntarily into a relation which is attended with responsibility").
164.
See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 202 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323
(1965)).
165.
The situation in question is one, like Merrill, where the patron specifically
informs the casino that he wants to be excluded. See Merrill, 320 F.3d 729.
166.
See, e.g., ILL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.700-.790 (2005).
167.
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770(c) (2005) (requiring that an Owner
licensee remove self-excluded persons from the gaming area).
168.
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770(a) (2005) (stating that "[n]o licensee
shall knowingly allow any person placed on the Self-Exclusion List pursuant to Section
3000.750 to enter the gaming premises of, or engage in gambling at, the riverboat gaming
operation").
169.
Martin v. McDonald's Corp., 572 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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performance of a voluntary undertaking. 170 These types of duties, even
though not otherwise existing at law, must still171 be "performed with a
reasonable degree of care, skill, and competence."'
The casinos that have self-exclusion programs have voluntarily chosen
to undertake a duty to evict patrons on the self-exclusion list. 172 Indeed, the
very title of the regulation in Illinois imposing this duty is "Duties of
Owner Licensees."' 173 By the wording of the regulation, Illinois has deemed
that "[n]o licensee shall knowingly allow any person placed on the SelfExclusion List... to enter the gaming premises, or to engage in gambling
at, the riverboat gaming operation."' 174 Thus, one would be hard pressed to
argue that the casino has not voluntarily undertaken the task of evicting
gamblers that have been placed on the exclusion list. 175 The analysis must
then turn to whether or not the duty the casino has undertaken176 should be
extended to the patron and not just to the Gaming Commission.
By voluntarily undertaking a duty to protect the gambler from a danger
(compulsive gambling) that it did not create, the casino may have "acquired
a duty under state tort law to provide him with adequate protection against
that danger. 177 In Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, the Supreme Court concluded that the state had no constitutional
duty to protect a child from his father's substantial abuse even after the
178
Department of Social Services (DSS) had knowledge of the abuse.
However, as mentioned by the court, that case may have concededly turned
out differently if the claim was brought not based on a violation of liberty
under § 1983179 and the Due Process Clause, but rather as a simple state law
tort claim.180 The situation that confronted young Joshua Deshaney 181 is
170. See Nelson v. Union Wire Rope, 199 N.E.2d 769 (111. 1964) (as cited in Martin,
572 N.E.2d 1073).
App. Ct. 1979).
171. Cross v. Chi. Housing Auth., 393 N.E.2d 580, 585 (I11.

172.
See ILL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2005). By "voluntarily," I mean the
casinos choose to follow the regulations imposed upon them or risk losing their gaming
licenses. In this sense, they truly are "voluntarily" undertaking this duty.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175.
See id.
176.
See Merrill, 320 F.3d at 732-33.
See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201-02
177.
(1989).
178.
See id.
179.
§ 1983 refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). § 1983, in essence, provides a federal
private cause of action for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws." Town of Castle Rock, Co. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796,
2802-03 (2005).
See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 201-02. The court stated that the State may have
180.
acquired a duty under stated tort law because it voluntarily undertook to protect Joshua
against a danger. If it did so negligently, it may be held liable. Id. This situation seems
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analogous in many respects to the situation a compulsive gambler is in once
he is placed on a self-exclusion list. In Joshua's case, DSS was aware that
he was in need of protection due to his numerous visits to the hospital for
injuries allegedly sustained from his father.' 82 In the case of a compulsive
gambler, the casino becomes explicitly aware of the patron's need for
"protection" through the enrollment in the Self-Exclusion Program.'83 The
argument for a duty in the compulsive gambling scenario seems to be even
greater because the gambler explicitly puts the casino on notice to what the
problem is and how it should be solved (exclusion). The DSS did not
adequately carry out its functions of monitoring and protecting Joshua;'84 if
a casino fails to evict a self-excluded gambler it is not properly carrying out
the functions it has promised to perform. 18 5 In both cases, the victim can be
harmed significantly, in no small part, because of the failure of the other
actor to follow through with their undertaking.
One example of the harm that may occur is illustrated in the Merrill
case. 186 Even though Merrill had asked to be excluded from the casino, he
was allowed back in and sustained large gambling losses.'8 7 Merrill ended
up robbing a number of banks because he needed money to cover his
gambling debt.' 88 He was caught and ended up serving time in a federal
prison.'8 9 Even though this was a separate incident, the court itself stated
that "[his] present predicament can be traced to his need for cash to cover
his gambling tab."' 0
extremely analogous to the situation contemplated by this comment - a casino undertakes to
provide protection (in the form of eviction) for the patron from something that is extremely
dangerous to the patron.
181.
The Winnebago County Department of Social Services (DSS) discovered that
four-year-old Joshua was a possible victim of child abuse in January of 1982. DSS
subsequently interviewed the father who, unsurprisingly, denied the accusation. One year
later, Joshua went to the hospital for thefirst time for bruises. DSS suspected child abuse,
but again, did nothing. The next month, Joshua returned to the hospital for the second time
with suspicious injuries. Over the next six months, DSS observed a number of suspicious
injuries to Joshua's head, but did nothing other than record the injuries. In November of
1983, Joshua was admitted to the hospital for the thirdtime. DSS did nothing. In March of
1984, Joshua was admitted to the hospital for the fourth time after his father beat him so bad
that he ended up in a coma. Although he did not die, Joshua suffered severe brain damage
and is expected to spend the remainder of his life in an "institution for the profoundly
retarded." Joshua's father was finally convicted of child abuse. Id.at 192-93.
182.
See id.
183.
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.760 (2005).
See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
184.
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2005).
185.
Merrill, 320 F.3d 729.
186.
at 731.
187.
See id.
188.
Id. at 730.
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
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A final example of harm being caused by casinos not following
through with their efforts to evict self-excluded gamblers, or even to stop
sending them marketing materials, is shown by a recent New Orleans case.
In that case, the gambler "notified a casino of his addiction, asking not to be
sent promotional [materials]."'1 9' He was still sent the materials, started
' 92
gambling again, and "incurred enormous debts and committed suicide.'
That man paid the ultimate price due, at least in part, to the casino's failure
to stop disseminating its marketing materials. Although the Deshaney
situation and the situation contemplated by this comment seem to deal with
significantly different subject matter, as shown by the93 previous analysis, the
similarities between the two situations are startling.
IV. TORT-BASED ECONOMIC LOSSES

Once it is established that, as mentioned above, a special relationship
can indeed exist between the casino and a self-excluded patron, one must
also look at the potential recovery in this situation since the scenarios
contemplated seem to consist purely of economic loss.
There have been a number of courts that have held that there is to be
no recovery in tort for purely economic losses. 194 The main reason for this
traditional rule seems to be that "negligence liability [in tort] is generally
based on a duty not to cause physical harm."' 195 Thus, without some type of
96
physical harm to the plaintiff, recovery was traditionally disallowed.97
However, a number of courts have begun to depart from this strict rule. 1
Many of the courts that have departed from this rule are beginning to
focus on the foreseeability of the injury rather than on the type of the injury
(i.e., physical versus economic harm). 98 Courts are now beginning to
"impose liability on defendants who, by virtue of their special activities,
professional training or other unique preparation for their work, had
191.
See Kindt, supra note 52, at 546.
192.
Id.
193.
Compare Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) with ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, §§ 3000.700-.790 (2005).
194.
See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (I11.1982).
195.
Robert M. Stonestreet, Comment, Replacing A Solid Wall With a Chain-Link
Fence: Special Relationship Analysis for Tort Recovery of Purely Economic Loss, 105 W.
VA. L. REv. 213, 217 (2002).
196.
See id. The physical harm rationale is applied in the absence of a contractual
relationship. Although a contractual relationship may indeed exist between a compulsive
gambler and a casino, see Wolfe, supra note 112, at 697-98, that concept is beyond the scope
of this comment.
197.
See, e.g., Aikens v. DeBow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000) (holding that
the existence of a special relationship can trigger recovery for a purely economic loss).
198.
See Stonestreet, supra note 195, at 215.
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particular knowledge or reason to know that others. . .would be
economically harmed by negligent conduct."' 99 This, in essence, means
that courts are willing to impose liability for purely economic losses if a
"special relationship" exists between the parties.2 °°
Once the focus of the court is moved from the type of injury to the
foreseeability of the injury, it is easy to see how a casino could be held
liable for a patron's economic losses. The economic injury sustained by the
patron is a foreseeable consequence of the casino's inaction. In Aikens v.
Debow, the court stated:
The existence of a special relationship will be determined
largely by the extent to which the particular plaintiff is
affected differently from society in general. It may be
evident from the defendant's knowledge or specific reason
to know of the potential consequences of the wrongdoing,
the persons likely to be injured, and the damages likely to
be suffered.20 1
A self-excluded compulsive gambler is no doubt affected by his
disease differently than society in general. It is also clearly evident that the
defendant knows (or at least should know) of the potential consequences
and damages to the gambler.
It is rather easy to see that there is, in fact, a special relationship
between the casino and the gambler.2 °2 When there is such a relationship
and there is clear foreseeability of the injury, it would be unjust not to
extend liability to the casino even if the loss to the gambler was purely
economic. 203
V.

ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPOSING THE DUTY

Along with the aforementioned reasoning, there are other justifications
for the imposition of a duty. By voluntarily undertaking to exclude the
patron from the casino, 2° the casino should be deemed to have created a
duty between itself and the gambler,
and thus should be liable for its
"negligence in connection therewith., 20 5

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
LITIGATION

People Express Airlines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 113 (N.J. 1985).
See Stonestreet, supra note 195, at 226.
Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 589.
See discussion supranotes 159-202.
See Stonestreet, supra note 195, at 247.
See ILL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2005).
See 1 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW - LIABILITY AND
§ 3:47 (2d ed. 2002).
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It is undisputable that the casinos, through the massive amount of
regulations that have been enacted, have been forced to take an active role
in the self-exclusion of compulsive gamblers.2 °6 It is also undisputable that
the casinos have explicit knowledge of the danger these gamblers face
through the use and recording of self-exclusion forms.2 °7 Because of the
procedure and regulations involved in soliciting these forms from
compulsive gamblers, the state has undertaken more than just a passive role
in the rehabilitation of these gamblers. 0 8 It is this active intervention into
the life of the gambler that "trigger[s] a fundamental duty to aid' 20 9 once
the casino knows that the gambler is in need of help. 2'0 Through the
regulations, the casino has announced to the gambler that it is the casino's
intent to help him. 2 1

It is this expression of intent, combined with the

knowledge of the gambler's plight that places a limitation on the gambler's
freedom to act on his behalf 21 2 According to the Supreme Court, it is this
type of limitation that gives rise to an affirmative duty.213 Once a gambler
believes that she will be barred from entering a casino after having been
placed on a self-exclusion list, she might not attempt to receive help
elsewhere.214
"One situation where a duty may arise from a voluntary undertaking is
where a person takes charge of another who is helpless adequately to aid or
protect himself or herself. ... ,,215 As was previously mentioned, compulsive
gamblers suffer from a mental condition that forces them to "continue to
gamble despite repeated efforts to control, cut back, or stop the
behavior.
,,2 6 Without the ability to control one's gambling, 17 it is
206.
See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, §§ 3000.700-790 (2005).
207.
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.751 (2005).
208.
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, §§ 3000.700-.790 (2005).
209.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210.
See id.
211.
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, §§ 3000.700-.790 (2005).
" '[T]he [actor's] knowledge of [an] individual's predicament [and] its
212.
expression of intent to help him' can amount to a 'limitation... on his freedom to act on his
own behalf or to obtain help from others." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 207 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
213.
Id. at 200.
214.
83% of the participants in a Canadian study stated that they desperately wanted
to stop gambling, but felt that they could not do it on their own. Robert Ladouceur et al.,
Analysis of a Casino's Self-Exclusion Program, 16 J. OF GAMBLING STUDIEs 453, 457
(2000). Many of the participants noted that they had used prior unsuccessful methods of
quitting. Id. Self-excluded gamblers may decide not to seek help elsewhere because they
believe, justifiably, that there is no need for it because the casinos have a "duty" to keep
them off of the casino premises.
215.
LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 205, § 3:47, at 3-137.
216.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssoCIATION, supra note 91, at 671.
217.
Id.
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logical to assume that the gambler is "helpless adequately to protect himself
or herself .... ,,218 As such, once the casino has put forth its position that it
will attempt to "help" the gambler, it should face the consequences if it
renders its "help" negligently.1 9
The casinos have put the gamblers on notice that it is the "duty" of the
licensee to evict them. 220 The gamblers, in reliance on the voluntary
assumption of that "duty," do not always attempt to seek help elsewhere.
By allowing the self-excluded patrons to gamble, the casinos have not
undertaken their duty with the requisite "reasonable degree of care, skill,
and competence, 22' and they should be held liable to the patrons for their
negligence.
'

VI. THE FUTURE OF SELF-EXCLUSION LITIGATION

The future of self-exclusion litigation is, at best, extremely uncertain.
The cases that have been litigated in the past seem to establish the
precedent that the casinos will not be liable in the future.222 However, the
casinos' responses lately to possible litigation have shown anything but a
belief that they will continue to be free from liability in the future.223
One example demonstrating the casino's failing confidence in its
freedom to allow self-excluded persons to gamble is illustrated by a recent
spat in Louisiana between a casino and pathological gambler, Joe
McNeely. 224 Not only did the casino not respect McNeely's wishes to be
free from casino marketing, it went so far as to send its executives to see
him at his mother's funeral.225 The casino, possibly afraid of losing in
court, settled confidentially with McNeely. 226 Another similar case arose in
New Orleans in the spring of 2001 that did begin to test the limits of the

218.
LEE, supra note 205, § 3:47, at 3-137.
219.
Id. at 3-136 (stating that "one who undertakes voluntarily to render services for
the benefit of another is liable to the other for any damages resulting from the actor's failure
to exercise reasonable care in the performance of the undertaking.").
220.
See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 3000.770 (2005).
221.
Cross v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 393 N.E.2d 580, 585 (111. App. Ct. 1979).
222.
See, e.g., Stulajter v. Harrah's Ind. Corp., 808 N.E.2d 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004);
Merrill v. Trump Ind. Inc., 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003).
223.
See Kindt, supra note 52, at 545-46.
224.
See id. Even though McNeely did not register in Louisiana's self-exclusion
program, he sent explicit instructions, in writing, to the casino requesting that they stop
targeting him for business. Id.
225.
Id.
226.
Id. The reasons that the casino put forth for its settlement were that it did not
want reveal "the extent of their 'deep pockets' or be viewed as 'easy targets.' "Id.
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self-exclusion program.227 Not surprisingly, this casino also chose to settle
the lawsuit amicably and confidentially instead of facing the possibility of
losing a public lawsuit.228
The precarious future of compulsive gambling litigation in the United
States is not unlike the unsettled future of compulsive gambling litigation
across the world. In Canada, for example, a number of lawsuits have been
filed against government-sponsored casinos alleging the same types of acts
that are at the heart of this comment. 229 Lisa Dickert filed one such lawsuit.
In March of 2002, Dickert signed and submitted a self-exclusion request to
Brantford Casino in Ontario. 230 The casino failed to exclude her, and she
subsequently brought suit.23
Once again, the casino chose to settle
confidentially instead of facing a public lawsuit.232 Other cases
in Canada
233
have reached, or are on their way to reaching, a similar result.

A substantial advance has been made in compulsive gambling
litigation in Austria.3 Christian Hainz, an extreme compulsive gambler,235
brought suit against two casinos to which he lost an enormous amount of
money.2 36 The court found the defendant, Casinos Austria, guilty of "gross
malfeasance and negligent behaviour" 237 because it failed to "restrict the
actions of a person who had all the signs of a compulsive gambler. '238 In
227.
See Kindt, supra note 52, at 546. A man, again, notified the casino and asked
not to be sent promotional materials. The casino failed to follow through with the man's
request and he ended up committing suicide. Id.
228.
See id.
229.
See Alex Igelman & Joseph Kelley, Status of Canadian Compulsive Gambling
Litigation, 9 GAMING L. REV. 116 (2005).

230.
See id.at ll6.
231.
Id.at 116-17. Lisa was in the casino for fifty-two hours straight before losing
heavily, getting in her car, and subsequently getting into an automobile accident. Id.
232.
See id.at 117.
233.
Seeid. at 118.
234.
See Michael Leidig, Gambling Addict Wins a Fortune in Court Ruling Against
Casino - Compulsive Player is Compensated by Austrian Operator thatFailedto Help Him
Kick the Habit, Sunday Tel. (U.K.), Feb. 22, 2004, at 33.
235.
Mr. Hainz lost over $3,000,000 during the course of 100 visits to casinos owned
by the defendant. Andy Rhea, Voluntary Self Exclusion Lists: How They Work and Potential
Problems, 9 GAMING L. REv. 462, 463 (2005). He also lost his business. Leidig, supra note
234.
236.
See Leidig, supra note 234. Hainz's lawyers claimed that the casinos had a
"duty of care towards their customers that should include turning away people who were
drunk and not properly in control of their actions, and people who could be classed as
.addicted gamblers.' " Id.
237.
Id.
238.
Id. It should be noted that the court ruled in favor of the gambler even though
the patron had not signed any type of self-exclusion form. See id. The court placed an even
higher burden upon the casino (that of requiring the casino to monitor the spending of all of
its gamblers) than is the focus of this argument. See id.
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doing so, the court established a precedent that casinos in that country have
a duty to monitor the spending tendencies of the patrons that visit the
casino.2 39
The status of compulsive gambling/self-exclusion litigation is in a
constant state of flux, not only in the United States, but across the world as
well.2 40 While many countries, including the United States, seem to be on
their way to achieving the proper solution to this type of problem, 24' it
appears that at least one country, Austria, has finally gotten it right.242 Even
though the future is always uncertain, "the duty to monitor pathological and
problem gamblers would seem to be a natural obligation of the [casino] and
could become a recognized legal duty by the early twenty-first century regardless of whether the pathological or problem gambler had alerted any
specific gambling facility.' ' 243 In any event, as shown by the rising amount
of confidential settlements in this area,244 notice given to the casino
regarding the gambler's wish to be excluded is a considerable addition to
the gambler's case.245
VII. CONCLUSION
Compulsive gambling is a problem that will not vanish any time in the
near future. Due to the vast number of people that this disease affects, 246 a
proper solution needs to be formulated soon to curb and prevent its
devastating effects on the individual, her family, and society as a whole.
Currently, the casinos are not doing their part to help eradicate this
problem. The casinos, forced by their representative Gaming Commissions,
appear to extend an uplifting hand to the "down-on-his-luck" self-excluded
gambler.247 However, this gratuity on the part of the casino is superficial if
the casino does not bear the burden of liability for not following through
with its promises. 248 In order for the self-exclusion program to accomplish
what it was designed to do - to actually keep these types of patrons out of
the casino - the casinos need to step up and fulfill their role in the process.
As stated previously, casinos derive a vast amount of their revenue from

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See Leidig, supra note 234.
See supra notes 223-240.
See supra notes 223-240.
See Leidig, supra note 234.
Kindt, supranote 52, at 541.
See, e.g., Kindt, supra note 52, at 545-46.
Kindt, supranote 52, at 541.
See National Council on Problem Gambling, supra note 1.
See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, §§ 3000.700-.790 (2005).
See, e.g., Merrill, 320 F.3d at 732-33.
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compulsive gamblers. 249 As the law currently stands, however, the casinos
250
get to derive this benefit without any subsequent burden or consequence
even when they have extended their hand to help these people. 25' It is
unjust for this to continue.
JUSTIN E. BAUER*

249.
See Kindt, supra note 52, at 545 (stating that twenty-seven to fifty-five percent
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250.
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